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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE G20’s INITIAL ACTION ITEMS 
STEPHANE ROTTIER AND NICOLAS VERON  
 
We, the Leaders of the Group of Twenty, held an initial meeting in Washington on November 15, 2008, amid 
serious challenges to the world economy and financial markets. We are determined to enhance our cooperation 
and work together to restore global growth and achieve needed reforms in the world’s financial systems. (...) 
We commit to implementing policies consistent with the following common principles for reform. Strengthening 
Transparency and Accountability (...). Enhancing Sound Regulation (...). Promoting Integrity in Financial 
Markets (...). Reinforcing International Cooperation (...). Reforming International Financial Institutions.(...) 
We are committed to taking rapid action to implement these principles. We instruct our Finance Ministers (...) to 
initiate processes and a timeline to do so. An initial list of specific measures is set forth in the attached Action 
Plan, including high priority actions to be completed prior to March 31, 2009. 
Final declaration of the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington DC,  
15 November 2008 
 
JUST A FEW WEEKS AFTER THE STUNNING COLLAPSE of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, world leaders 
established the G20 as the most prominent venue to coordinate international economic policy. The summit’s final 
declaration contained an action plan with a list of 47 action items, 39 of them relating to financial regulation and 
the others on broadly related issues such as tax, controls on capital flows, actions to fight terrorism financing and 
money laundering, and general reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
In this policy contribution, we score the 47 action items and grade their implementation and follow-up. The 
motivation came from the preparation of the Bruegel Policy Brief “Not All Financial Regulation Is Global”, published 
by Bruegel in late August 2010. However, the authors hope that this scoreboard will also be of use to other 
researchers and observers interested in the effectiveness of G20 decision-making.  
Section 1 below briefly describes our assessment methodology, and section 2 presents the scoreboard and 
summary of findings. In annex, we provide a short narrative presentation of the assessment underlying our 
scoring of each of the 47 action items.  
 
1. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
We grade the implementation of all 47 action items of the 2008 G20 Washington Summit Declaration according to 
three criteria.  
•  The most important criterion is the effectiveness of implementation, grading it from 0 (nothing done) to 5 
(fully implemented action item).  
•  Secondly, we look at the cross-border consistency of implementation measures ranking from 0 (no 
coordination) to 3 (fully consistent or even harmonised).  
•  Lastly, we consider the follow-up initiatives until now to the action item (scoring from 0 to 2).  
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Adding all three scores, we get a general weighted score (between 0 and 10) that provides us with a general 
indicator of implementation of each action item.  
The assessment is based on the progress reports circulated by the G20 and the FSB
1, as well as complementary 
information published by public bodies and the media. Some action items have been fully implemented; for some 
others, there are vague commitments but no compelling action; a few have practically disappeared from the 
agenda. In carrying out the assessment, we had to use our judgment as the importance, relevance and 
effectiveness of measures taken on some items is not always a matter of consensus.  
Separately, for each action item we identify which institution(s) was assigned the leading role in implementing it. 
These are either national authorities or global bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Financial Stability Board (FSB), International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), or Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). In accounting matters, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) was also identified as co-leader for several action items.  
Based on this identification of lead institution(s), we assigned each action item to one of four groups ranked by 
increasing order of autonomy at global level:  
•  First group: implementation led by national (or EU) authorities and not by global institution(s);  
•  Second group: implementation led by global institution(s) with limited autonomy of resources, 
administration, and policy initiative, typically forums in which initial policy proposals are drafted by 
committees of national (or EU) authorities, notably the FSB;  
•  Third group: implementation led by global institution(s) with significant autonomy of resources, 
administration, and policy initiative, typically bodies in which initial policy proposals are drafted by a 
permanent staff at global level, including the BCBS, FATF, IAIS, IASB (on some items in co-lead with FASB), and 
IOSCO;  
•  Fourth group: implementation led by global institution(s) with high autonomy of resources, administration, 
and policy initiative, typically based on a formal international treaty, including the IMF, OECD, and World Bank.  
 
2. ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
The results of the assessment for each action item are provided in the following scoreboard:  
 
Action Item (summarised)  Effectiveness Cross-border 
consistency 
Follow-
up 
Total 
score 
Lead institution in 
implementation 
Group
1. Accounting for complex instruments  4  2 0 6 IASB-FASB  3
2. Accounting for off-balance sheet 
vehicles 
2  2 2 6 IASB-FASB  3
3. Disclosure for complex instruments  4  2 2 8 IASB-FASB  3
4. Governance accounting standard 
setting bodies 
1  1 1 3 IASB  3
5. Best practices hedge funds  3  1 2 6 National authorities  1
6. Single accounting standards  2  1 1 4 IASB-FASB  3
7. Consistent application accounting 
standards 
1  0 0 1 National authorities  1
                                                            
1 The latest progress  reports can be found at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July_2010_G20_Progress_Grid.pdf and 
on http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100627c.pdf 
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Action Item (summarised)  Effectiveness Cross-border  Follow- Total  Lead institution in  Group
consistency  up  score  implementation 
8. Enhanced risk disclosure on ongoing 
basis 
2  1 1 4 FSB 2
9. Mitigate pro-cyclicality  4  3 2 9 BCBS  3
10. FSAP every 5 years  4  3 1 8 IMF 4
11. Regulate all systemically important 
institutions 
4  1 2 7 BCBS-IAIS-IOSCO  3
12. Orderly cross-border resolution  4  2 1 7 IMF 4
13. Harmonised capital definition  4  3 2 9 BCBS  3
14. Regulation incentives credit rating 
agencies 
3  1 1 5 BCBS-IOSCO  3
15. Adoption by credit rating agencies of 
IOSCO standards 
4  1 0 5 IOSCO  3
16. Strengthened capital requirements  4  2 2 8 BCBS  3
17.CDS and OTC market transparency  2  1 1 4 FSB 2
18. Registration credit- rating agencies 
(CRAs) 
4  0 0 4 National authorities  1
19. Robust liquidity supervision of cross-
border banks 
4  3 1 8 BCBS  3
20. Regulation risk management 
practices 
2  1 1 4 National authorities  1
21. Regulation liquidity risk management  4  2 2 8 BCBS  3
22. Measurement risk concentration  3  1 1 5 BCBS  3
23. Reassess risk management models  1  0 1 2 National authorities  1
24. Develop stress-test models  3  1 1 5 BCBS  3
25. No excessive risk incentives-
compensation 
3  1 1 5 FSB 2
26. Diligence over structured products  2  1 0 3 BCBS-IOSCO  3
27. Regulate innovative products  1  0 0 1 FSB 2
28. Monitor asset prices  1  1 0 2 National authorities  1
29. Regulatory cooperation between 
jurisdictions 
1  1 1 3 National authorities  1
30. Cross-border information sharing  4  1 2 7 FSB 2
31. Combating market manipulation and 
fraud 
1  1 0 2 National authorities  1
32. Protect from uncooperative 
jurisdictions 
3  1 1 5 National authorities  1
33. Anti money-laundering  3  2 1 6 FATF  3
34. Tax information exchange  4  2 1 7 OECD  4
35. Cross-border supervisory colleges  4  2 2 8 BCBS  3
36. Strengthen cross-border crisis 
management 
3  1 1 5 FSB 2
37. Assess needs for regulatory 
convergence 
1  1 1 3 FSB 2
38. Coordinate exit crisis response  3  0 0 3 National authorities  1
39.Expansion FSF to FSB  5  2 1 8 FSB 4
40. Early warning exercises  3  2 2 7 IMF 4
41. Draw lessons crisis  4  3 1 8 IMF 4
42. Adequate resources for IFIs  5  3 2 10 IMF-World Bank  4
43. Restore private capital flows to 
emerging markets 
4  3 1 8 World Bank  4
44. Multilateral development bank (MDB) 
financing 
4  2 2 8 World Bank  4
45. Reform governance Bretton Woods 
institutions 
3  2 2 7 IMF-World Bank  4
46. Financial sector surveillance  4  3 2 9 IMF 4
47. Capacity building on financial 
regulation 
3  2 1 6 IMF 4
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The average scores for each of the groups based on the type of leading institution (s) are provided in the following 
table:  
 
  Effectiveness score  Consistency 
score 
Follow-up 
score  Total score 
Group 1 (national authorities)  2.00  0.60  0.60  3.20 
Group 2 (FSB)  2.63  1.00  1.00  4.63 
Group 3 (BCBS, IASB, IOSCO, IAIS, FATF)  3.28  1.72  1.28  6.28 
Group 4 (IMF, OECD, World Bank)  3.82  2.45  1.45  7.73 
 
A strong correlation is observed between the total score and the nature of the main public institution(s) in charge. 
The more the implementation of the action item depends on action by an international body with significant 
autonomy, the stronger the implementation score. The more its implementation depends on action by national 
authorities and the softer the coordination mechanism, the less effective and consistent the implementation. 
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ANNEX: DETAILED ASSESSMENT 
 
Strengthening transparency and accountability
1. The key global accounting standards 
bodies should work to enhance guidance 
for valuation of securities, also taking into 
account the valuation of complex, illiquid 
products, especially during times of stress. 
Guidance issued by both FASB and IASB, but still no consensus on 
scope of fair-value accounting. 
2. Accounting standard setters should 
significantly advance their work to address 
weaknesses in accounting and disclosure 
standards for off-balance sheet vehicles. 
Joint FASB/IASB work on consolidation and derecognition. Final 
standards yet to be adopted and may differ between IFRS and US 
GAAP. 
3. Regulators and accounting standard 
setters should enhance the required 
disclosure of complex financial 
instruments by firms to market 
participants. 
IFRS 9 modifies classification of financial instrument categories; 
effect on complexity still controversial. 
4. With a view toward promoting financial 
stability, the governance of the 
international accounting standard setting 
body should be further enhanced, including 
by undertaking a review of its membership, 
in particular in order to ensure 
transparency, accountability, and an 
appropriate relationship between this 
independent body and the relevant 
authorities.  
A Monitoring Board of public authorities was created early 2009 
along the lines announced before the Washington Summit. 
However, the governance framework remains incomplete and 
potentially unstable. There is no international consensus at this 
point. The new chair of the IFRS Foundation Trustees has 
announced a forthcoming strategic review.  
5. Private sector bodies that have already 
developed best practices for private pools 
of capital and/or hedge funds should bring 
forward proposals for a set of unified best 
practices. Finance ministers should assess 
the adequacy of these proposals, drawing 
upon the analysis of regulators, the 
expanded FSF, and other relevant bodies.  
Various initiatives in Canada, the EU, US but not much 
coordination.  
Cooperation between US Securities and Exchange Commission and 
UK Financial Services Authority.  
IOSCO template for the global collection of hedge-fund information. 
6. The key global accounting standards 
bodies should work intensively toward the 
objective of creating a single high-quality 
global standard.  
Intensive work on convergence but essential differences unlikely 
to be resolved, especially on fair value. The convergence timetable 
has already slipped from the mid-2011 deadline announced in 
Pittsburgh. Replacement of David Tweedie as IASB Chair likely to 
impact the convergence discussion.  
7. Regulators, supervisors, and accounting 
standard setters, as appropriate, should 
work with each other and the private sector 
on an ongoing basis to ensure consistent 
application and enforcement of high-
quality accounting standards.  
No meaningful progress, nor clear expression of political will. Even 
at EU level, consistency of IFRS implementation not properly 
enforced. One crucial dimension is cross-border audit consistency, 
where very little currently exists – no long-term consensus on 
Sarbanes-Oxley extraterritorial provisions, and no willingness to 
give teeth to the International Forum of Independent Audit 
Regulators (IFIAR).  
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8. Financial institutions should provide 
enhanced risk disclosures in their reporting 
and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, 
consistent with international best practice, 
as appropriate. Regulators should work to 
ensure that a financial institution’s 
financial statements include a complete, 
accurate, and timely picture of the firm’s 
activities (including off balance-sheet 
activities) and are reported on a consistent 
and regular basis.  
FSB will organise peer review on disclosure by major financial 
institutions in mid 2010.  
Various initiatives at national level. 
Regulatory regimes 
9. The IMF, expanded FSF, and other 
regulators and bodies should develop 
recommendations to mitigate pro-
cyclicality, including the review of how 
valuation and leverage, bank capital, 
executive compensation, and provisioning 
practices may exacerbate cyclical trends. 
Three reports published in April 09 on bank capital, loan loss 
provisioning and interaction of valuation and leverage practices.  
BCBS consultation on counter-cyclical buffers closes on 10 
September.  
Final agreement expected by the end of the year.  
10. To the extent countries or regions have 
not already done so, each country or region 
pledges to review and report on the 
structure and principles of its regulatory 
system to ensure it is compatible with a 
modern and increasingly globalised 
financial system. To this end, all G20 
members commit to undertake a Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) report 
and support the transparent assessments 
of countries’ national regulatory systems.  
Commitment to FSAP every 5 years is partly respected.  
First FSAP of the US finalised in 2010.   
FSAP underway for China and Indonesia. 
No Argentina FSAP.  
FSB peer reviews for Italy, Mexico, Spain in 2010. 
11. The appropriate bodies should review 
the differentiated nature of regulation in 
the banking, securities, and insurance 
sectors and provide a report outlining the 
issue and making recommendations on 
needed improvements. A review of the 
scope of financial regulation, with a special 
emphasis on institutions, instruments, and 
markets that are currently unregulated, 
along with ensuring that all systemically-
important institutions are appropriately 
regulated, should also be undertaken.  
Reviews by the Joint Forum (BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO) with 
recommendations in January 2010. 
IAIS issued in April 2010 guidance paper on treatment of non-
regulated entities in group-wide supervision. 
FSB will look at implementation. 
Follow-up varies across countries: Dodd-Frank bill in US, AIFM 
directive (still in discussion) in EU, etc.  
 
12. National and regional authorities 
should review resolution regimes and 
bankruptcy laws in light of recent 
experience to ensure that they permit an 
orderly wind-down of large complex cross-
border financial institutions.  
Reviews done by BCBS, IMF, World Bank. 
IMF proposal on international framework for legal issues of 
insolvency of cross-border financial groups in June 2010.  
BCBS report with recommendations in March 2010 but slow 
implementation.  
Slow process within EU (2011).  
FSB report expected in autumn 2010.  
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13. Definitions of capital should be 
harmonised in order to achieve consistent 
measures of capital and capital adequacy.  
Finalisation by BCBS expected in autumn 2010.  
 
 
 
Prudential oversight 
14. Regulators should take steps to 
ensure that credit-rating agencies meet 
the highest standards of the 
international organisation of securities 
regulators and that they avoid conflicts 
of interest, provide greater disclosure to 
investors and to issuers, and 
differentiate ratings for complex 
products. This will help ensure that credit-
rating agencies have the right incentives 
and appropriate oversight to enable them 
to perform their important role in 
providing unbiased information and 
assessments to markets.  
Progress in adoption of IOSCO code of conduct by credit-rating 
agencies. 
IOSCO launched consultation examining arbitrage opportunities 
between supervisory jurisdictions in May 2010.  
IOSCO issued principles regarding cross-border supervisory 
cooperation in May 2010.  
BCBS is reviewing inappropriate incentives in using external ratings 
in the regulatory capital framework.  
New legislation or rules in EU, Japan, Australia, India; under 
consideration in Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico and others.  
 
15. The international organisation of 
securities regulators should review 
credit- rating agencies’ adoption of the 
standards and mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance.  
IOSCO reviewed the extent to which the agencies’ own codes satisfy 
its guidelines. OK for large global CRAs. 
IOSCO finalised a common monitoring module for CRAs in 2009. 
No further follow-up. 
 
16. Authorities should ensure that 
financial institutions maintain adequate 
capital in amounts necessary to sustain 
confidence. International standard-
setters should set out strengthened 
capital requirements for banks’ 
structured credit and securitisation 
activities.  
New BCBS proposals on regulatory capital treatment of 
securitization to be finalised in 2010. 
US and EU stress tests in 2009, 2010 respectively. 
Government recapitalisation interventions. 
 
17. Supervisors and regulators, building 
on the imminent launch of central 
counterparty services for credit default 
swaps (CDS) in some countries, should: 
speed efforts to reduce the systemic 
risks of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives transactions; insist that 
market participants support exchange-
traded or electronic trading platforms for 
CDS contracts; expand OTC derivatives-
market transparency; and ensure that 
the infrastructure for OTC derivatives can 
support growing volumes.  
Limited progress so far in introducing central counterparties and 
standardisation and transparency in OTC derivatives market.  
G20 call for central counterparties clearing by 2012: limited efforts 
by the industry.  
Divergences across countries / regulatory arbitrage.  
Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and 
IOSCO finalising guidance.  
FSB working group on standardisation to suggest options in October 
2010. 
18. Credit-rating agencies that provide  New legislation or rules in EU, Japan, Australia, India. 
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public ratings should be registered.   Under consideration in Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico and 
others.  
No global registration discussed.  
19. Supervisors and central banks should 
develop robust and internationally 
consistent approaches for liquidity 
supervision of, and central bank liquidity 
operations for, cross-border banks.  
Basel III framework expected to be finalised in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Risk management 
20. Regulators should develop enhanced 
guidance to strengthen banks’ risk 
management practices, in line with 
international best practices, and should 
encourage financial firms to re-examine 
their internal controls and implement 
strengthened policies for sound risk 
management.  
BCBS supplemental guidance under the Pillar 2 supervisory review 
process of Basel II issued in July 2009. 
Self-assessment by 20 large financial institutions in 2009. 
Limited progress in various countries. 
21. Regulators should develop and 
implement procedures to ensure that 
financial firms implement policies to 
better manage liquidity risk, including by 
creating strong liquidity cushions.  
BCBS measures to be finalised by end-2010 (liquidity coverage ratio 
plus in longer term net stable funding ratio). 
22. Supervisors should ensure that 
financial firms develop processes that 
provide for timely and comprehensive 
measurement of risk concentrations and 
large counterparty risk positions across 
products and geographies.  
The BCBS reviewed the treatment of counterparty credit risk under 
all three pillars of Basel II and is modifying the treatment of 
counterparty credit risk, strengthening the risk coverage of the 
capital framework. 
23. Firms should reassess their risk 
management models to guard against 
stress and report to supervisors on their 
efforts.  
In October 2009, twenty large financial institutions undertook a self-
assessment exercise. It was considered too positive by the Senior 
Supervisors Group. 
24. The Basel Committee should study 
the need for, and help develop, firms’ new 
stress testing models, as appropriate.  
BCBS principles in May 2009.
Limited follow-up. 
25. Financial institutions should have 
clear internal incentives to promote 
stability, and action needs to be taken, 
through voluntary effort or regulatory 
action, to avoid compensation schemes 
which reward excessive short-term 
returns or risk taking.  
The FSF (in London endorsed by FSB) published Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices for financial institutions to prevent 
incentives for excessive risk-taking that may arise from 
compensation schemes : for voluntary effort. 
Various countries have taken unilateral measures (eg bonus 
taxation). 
Wyman study for FSB shows lack of regulatory consistency and 
ongoing first- mover problems.  
Thematic review by FSB shows  much better implementation by 
industrial countries than developing countries (assessing team 
members were Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Singapore, South 
Africa, Switzerland, the BCBS and OECD) 
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26. Banks should exercise effective risk- 
management and due diligence over 
structured products and securitisation 
I n  J u l y  2 0 0 9  t h e  B C B S  i s s u e d  final standards to raise capital 
requirements for resecuritisations, and enhanced risk-management 
requirements around structured products and off balance-sheet 
activities. 
IOSCO published a report on regulatory issues related to securitised 
products and CDS in September 2009.  
IOSCO June 2009 report on Good Practices in Relation to Investment 
Managers’ Due Diligence when Investing in Structured Finance 
Instruments. 
National initiatives to introduce quantitative retention 
requirements. 
27. International standard setting bodies, 
working with a broad range of economies 
and other appropriate bodies, should 
ensure that regulatory policy makers are 
aware and able to respond rapidly to 
evolution and innovation in financial 
markets and products.  
No significant initiative apart from ongoing FSB monitoring.
28. Authorities should monitor 
substantial changes in asset prices and 
their implications for the macroeconomy 
and the financial system.  
Nothing specific. 
Monitoring by IMF and BIS and national authorities.  
Promoting integrity in financial markets 
29. Our national and regional authorities 
should work together to enhance 
regulatory cooperation between 
jurisdictions on a regional and international 
level.  
No real coordination. 
Informal exchanges at FSB.  
FSB crisis management contact list of major jurisdictions. 
IAIS and IOSCO multilateral memorandums of understanding 
(MoUs) concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information. 
No initiatives on regulation, only on supervision (except intra-EU 
with Larosière report and follow-up). 
30. National and regional authorities 
should work to promote information-
sharing about domestic and cross-border 
threats to market stability and ensure that 
national (or regional, where applicable) 
legal provisions are adequate to address 
these threats.  
FSB principles for cross border crisis management. 
Information sharing via colleges of supervisors. 
EU: implementation of Larosière report. 
31. National and regional authorities 
should also review business conduct rules 
to protect markets and investors, 
especially against market manipulation 
and fraud and strengthen their cross-
border cooperation to protect the 
international financial system from illicit 
actors. In case of misconduct, there should 
be an appropriate sanctions regime.  
IOSCO principles for effective regulation of short selling. 
Various domestic initiatives. 
32. National and regional authorities Peer pressure: countermeasures by individual countries.
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should implement national and 
international measures that protect the 
global financial system from uncooperative 
and non-transparent jurisdictions that 
pose risks of illicit financial activity.  
FSAPs by IMF. 
33. The Financial Action Task Force should 
continue its important work against money 
laundering and terrorist financing, and we 
support the efforts of the World Bank - UN 
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative.  
In June 2009 new procedures were agreed by the FATF’s 
International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) to identify high risk 
and uncooperative jurisdictions.  
Prima facie review of jurisdictions discussed in October 2009 
plenary meeting.  
Targeted review of around 25 jurisdictions ongoing. 
34. Tax authorities, drawing upon the work 
of relevant bodies such as the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), should continue 
efforts to promote tax information 
exchange. Lack of transparency and a 
failure to exchange tax information should 
be vigorously addressed.  
Naming and shaming.
OECD grey list becomes shorter. 
Bilateral pressure.  
300 bilateral agreements signed in 2009.  
Peer-review group chaired by France.  
 
 
 
 
Reinforcing international cooperation 
35. Supervisors should collaborate to 
establish supervisory colleges for all major 
cross-border financial institutions, as part 
of efforts to strengthen the surveillance of 
cross-border firms. Major global banks 
should meet regularly with their 
supervisory college for comprehensive 
discussions of the firm’s activities and 
assessment of the risks it faces.  
Colleges installed for more than thirty large complex financial 
institutions.   
Need to improve efficiency: FSB is reviewing the role of 
supervisory colleges. 
IAIS supervisory guidance 2009 for group-wide supervision. 
IOSCO released a set of Principles Regarding Cross-Border 
Supervisory Cooperation in May 2010. 
BCBS good practice consultative document in March 2010. 
36. Regulators should take all steps 
necessary to strengthen cross-border 
crisis management arrangements, 
including on cooperation and 
communication with each other and with 
appropriate authorities, and develop 
comprehensive contact lists and conduct 
simulation exercises, as appropriate.  
FSB Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management.
FSB is to propose in October concrete policy recommendations to 
address the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problems associated with systemically 
important financial institutions. 
Improving resolution tools in many countries. 
Effectiveness of MoUs still weak in crisis times, even within Europe 
37. Authorities, drawing especially on the 
work of regulators, should collect 
information on areas where convergence in 
regulatory practices such as accounting 
standards, auditing, and deposit insurance 
is making progress, is in need of 
accelerated progress, or where there may 
be potential for progress.  
FSB general discussions.
Selected studies by IMF.  
38. Authorities should ensure that 
temporary measures to restore stability 
and confidence have minimal distortions 
Little coordination by authorities. 
Work on exit by IMF and BIS but only principles at this stage.  
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and are unwound in a timely, well-
sequenced and coordinated manner.  
Reforming international financial institutions(IFIs)
39. The FSF should expand to a broader 
membership of emerging economies.  
Expanded in London summit.
Countries unequally represented (three tiers). 
Committee chairs dominated by ‘old’ FSF members (developed 
economies).  
40. The IMF, with its focus on surveillance, 
and the expanded FSF, with its focus on 
standard-setting, should strengthen their 
collaboration, enhancing efforts to better 
integrate regulatory and supervisory 
responses into the macro-prudential policy 
framework and conduct early warning 
exercises.  
Early-warning exercise is mainly fed by input from the IMF staff.
Output and methodology improving. 
Collaboration IMF-FSB relatively limited: conservative MoU IMF-FSB 
(see 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_081113.pdf) 
41. The IMF, given its universal 
membership and core macro-financial 
expertise, should, in close coordination 
with the FSF and others, take a leading role 
in drawing lessons from the current crisis, 
consistent with its mandate.  
IMF paper but remains rather general.
BCBS and FSB also have papers on specific lessons from the crisis. 
42. We should review the adequacy of the 
resources of the IMF, the World Bank Group 
and other multilateral development banks 
and stand ready to increase them where 
necessary. The IFIs should also continue to 
review and adapt their lending instruments 
to adequately meet their members’ needs 
and revise their lending role in the light of 
the ongoing financial crisis.  
Decisive action for IMF: expanded New Arrangements to Borrow, 
including IMF notes. 
Quota increase discussions ongoing.  
Up to $10 billion in new concessional lending to low-income 
countries for 2009-2011, and up to $17 billion through to 2014. 
Capital increase of multilateral development banks (MDBs). 
IMF new Flexible Credit Line and reformed lending and 
conditionality framework. 
General allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) $250 billion. 
Financial Safety Nets Experts Group has been established to 
explore policy options to help countries cope with financial 
volatility and to reduce economic disruption from sudden swings 
in capital flows. 
 
43. We should explore ways to restore 
emerging and developing countries’ access 
to credit and resume private capital flows 
which are critical for sustainable growth 
and development, including ongoing 
infrastructure investment.  
Capital flows resumed from low point in crisis.  
Easier access to IMF concessional financing. 
MDBs have stepped up their efforts to leverage private capital to 
maximise their impact, through development of new initiatives or 
reinforcement of existing ones. 
44. In cases where severe market 
disruptions have limited access to the 
necessary financing for counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies, multilateral development 
banks must ensure arrangements are in 
place to support, as needed, those 
countries with a good track record and 
sound policies.  
New lending instruments and resources for MDBs. 
Increased lending limits. 
The World Bank is developing an approach to expand the use of 
IBRD resources for specific projects in IDA countries based on the 
IBRD Enclave framework (IBRD=International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IDA=International Development 
Association, both parts of the World Bank Group). 
More flexible debt-sustainability framework. 
© Bruegel 2010    WWW.BRUEGEL.ORG  
© Bruegel 2010    WWW.BRUEGEL.ORG 
013
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE G20’s INITIAL ACTION ITEMSStephaneRottierandNicolasVeron 
45. We underscored that the Bretton 
Woods Institutions must be 
comprehensively reformed so that they 
can more adequately reflect changing 
economic weights in the world economy 
and be more responsive to future 
challenges. Emerging and developing 
economies should have greater voice and 
representation in these institutions.  
More diverse recruitment.
The International Monetary and Financial Committee called in 
2009 and 2010 for a shift to dynamic emerging markets and 
developing countries of at least 5 percent from overrepresented to 
under-represented countries before January 2011 and for an 
acceleration of the substantial work still needed on management 
selection, ministerial engagement, board composition and size, 
voting majorities, and staff diversity. 
IBRD shareholders are in the process of approving increase basic 
votes; a third Director from sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be 
elected in the October 2010 board elections.  
46. The IMF should conduct vigorous and 
even-handed surveillance reviews of all 
countries, as well as giving greater 
attention to their financial sectors and 
better integrating the reviews with the joint 
IMF/World Bank financial sector 
assessment programs. On this basis, the 
role of the IMF in providing macro-financial 
policy advice would be strengthened.  
Coverage of financial sector issues in surveillance is being 
reinforced by the new Financial Sector Surveillance Guidance Note, 
recent reforms to the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), and complementary efforts to integrate financial sector 
work into surveillance. 
More diverse recruitment.  
47. Advanced economies, the IMF, and 
other international organisations should 
provide capacity-building programs for 
emerging market economies and 
developing countries on the formulation 
and the implementation of new major 
regulations, consistent with international 
standards.  
Ongoing efforts by International Financial Institutions, but 
prioritization of resources. 
 